Maintenance Wasabi status
wasabi.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Wasabi's status page shows “Maintenance” in AP-Southeast-1 (Singapore) and AP-Northeast-2 (Osaka); the vendor is postmortem. User reports haven't spiked, so wide impact isn't visible yet.
confidence: low Vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Maintenance · 2 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: AP-Southeast-1 (Singapore), AP-Northeast-2 (Osaka)
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 42 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | 26 min |
Evidence
- Official page: Maintenance (“Service Under Maintenance”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “System Errors in AP-SOUTHEAST-1”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Wasabi's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal).
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Wasabi. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Wasabi, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Wasabi. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
System Errors in AP-SOUTHEAST-1
major postmortem · started · resolved
4 updates
- investigating
We are currently investigating an issue impacting the AP-SOUTHEAST-1 (Singapore) region. Due to a power event at the site, services in the region are impacted and customers may experience errors or failed requests.
- monitoring
Our team has identified the issue and fixed it. At the moment everything is back to normal and we will continue to monitor before we mark this event as resolved.
- resolved
Incident resolved
- postmortem
On October 10, 2026, between 01:10 and 02:30 UTC, customers may have experienced degraded performance and elevated error rates in the Singapore region due to a power unit failure at the data center. The failure disrupted connectivity to the underlying infrastructure, reducing traffic levels and interrupting API operations. The data center team replaced the failed unit and restored power at approximately 02:23 UTC. Our team then worked with the data center provider to bring the affected equipment back online at 02:30 UTC, after which services recovered and traffic returned to normal levels. We monitored the recovery to confirm that operations had returned to normal. For any questions, please reach out to [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]).
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.