Degraded / minor incident Scaleway status
scaleway.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Scaleway's status page shows “Degraded / minor incident” in Block Storage and Databases; the vendor is resolved. User reports haven't spiked, so wide impact isn't visible yet.
confidence: low Vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Degraded / minor incident · 6 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP AS12876: routing data not loaded on this view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Block Storage, Databases, Instances
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 30 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | 15 h 22 min |
Evidence
- Official page: Degraded / minor incident (“Partially Degraded Service”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “[fr-par-1] Latencies spikes during the day following capacity increase in one of block storage cluster”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Scaleway's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal).
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Scaleway. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Scaleway, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Scaleway. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
[fr-par-1] Latencies spikes during the day following capacity increase in one of block storage cluster
minor resolved · started · resolved
6 updates
- identified
Since monday 26 october on the morning, we noticed increased periodic spike of latencies following the integration of a new rack in one of our cluster. Those spikes are more noticeable during the day and are linked to writes done on some of the new disks. This issue also impact MRDB product. We limited the impact and currently we are working on a fix. An update will be posted at the end of the day.
- identified
We applied a fix on one of the concerned servers and monitoring it, we will have more significant metrics tomorrow.
- identified
The fix improved nvme behavior during the day and today we applied it on half of the concerned rack. As data must be removed first to apply the fix, migrations operations are processing slowly to avoid worsening impact on latencies. Migration operations will continue through the week-end.
- identified
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
- monitoring
All new servers have been fixed. We are still increasing data density in the servers and monitoring any latency spikes.
- resolved
This incident has been resolved.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.