Operational Sauce Labs status
saucelabs.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread Sauce Labs problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 88 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “2026-August-25 Service Incident”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Sauce Labs' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Sauce Labs. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Sauce Labs, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers Sauce Labs may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Sauce Labs. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
2026-August-25 Service Incident
none postmortem · started · resolved
3 updates
- investigating
We are currently seeing elevated error rates for macOS and iOS tests in the US-West-1 data center. We are currently investigating.
- resolved
After taking remedial action, all macOS and iOS tests are now performing as expected in the US-West-1 Data center. All services are fully operational.
- postmortem
### **Dates:** Tuesday August 25th 2026, 11:38 – 13:10 UTC ### **What happened:** Customers running macOS and iOS tests in our US-West region experienced degraded service. Roughly 50% of the virtual Mac capacity in the region stopped accepting new tests, so tests either queued or failed to start. Remaining capacity came under additional pressure as work shifted onto it, which extended start times for both desktop and simulator tests. ### **Why it happened:** An internal security certificate used by our Mac hosts to reach a supporting cloud service reached its expiry date. Once it lapsed, the hosts could no longer establish a trusted connection to that service and stopped provisioning new test machines. The certificate had been issued manually and had neither automated renewal nor expiry alerting. ### **How we fixed it:** We issued and deployed a replacement certificate, which restored co
Community comments (0)
Comments are opinions of visitors, not statements by Cloudy_Day. Every comment is held for review before it appears. Links are removed, and personal data is redacted. Community guidelines.
No approved comments yet.
How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.