APIs: messaging, media, analytics
Operational LiveKit Cloud status
livekit.io · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread LiveKit Cloud problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: US Central - Real Time Communication
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 33 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Investigating reports of elevated API failures in Chicago region”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside LiveKit Cloud's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on LiveKit Cloud. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on LiveKit Cloud, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers LiveKit Cloud may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with LiveKit Cloud. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Investigating reports of elevated API failures in Chicago region
minor postmortem · started · resolved
4 updates
- investigating
We are currently investigating reports of elevated API errors across our services in the Chicago region.
- monitoring
A fix has been implemented as of 17:00 UTC and we are seeing the errors return back to baseline. We are continuing to monitor before marking this resolved.
- resolved
Between 16:35-17:03 UTC, Chicago region experienced about 11% failure rates in API errors, failed agent dispatches, and issues connecting to rooms. We faced another wave of the same issue between 17:47-17:53 UTC where the failure rates were less than 10%. Room Service APIs called from other regions targeting to a room hosted in Chicago region were also affected during this period. API requests made with recent server SDK versions are automatically retried in other regions, so customers on those versions should not have seen these errors. The last related errors occurred at 17:53 UTC, and all affected services are operating normally since. We will share a detailed RCA with more information soon.
- postmortem
## Summary On October 19, 2026, between 16:34 and 17:03 UTC and again between 17:47 and 17:54 UTC, some room management, agent dispatch and SIP API requests failed for rooms hosted in our US Central \(Chicago\) region. Requests from other regions that targeted those rooms also failed. During these windows some rooms could not be created or joined, and some agents were not dispatched. The cause was CPU exhaustion on the node running one of our message bus instances in US Central. A recently deployed overlay network used more CPU than it requested, and because our monitoring tracked CPU per pod rather than per node, we didn't see the node run out. That message bus instance began dropping messages, and a room-coordination service that depended on it stopped completing requests. We have moved the message bus in US Central onto larger nodes and resized other regions at similar risk. Node-leve
Community comments (0)
Comments are opinions of visitors, not statements by Cloudy_Day. Every comment is held for review before it appears. Links are removed, and personal data is redacted. Community guidelines.
No approved comments yet.
How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.