Operational Linode (Akamai Cloud) status
linode.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread Linode (Akamai Cloud) problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: minor.
- Vendor status page Operational · 3 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP AS63949: routing data not loaded on this view
- News & network weather 0 active / 2 recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Akamai: Degraded / minor incident
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: US-ORD (Chicago), US-SEA (Seattle), BR-GRU (São Paulo) Block Storage
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 30 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Customer Security Advisory: PHP Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Akamai reports an issue. Linode (Akamai Cloud) may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Linode (Akamai Cloud)'s own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: minor. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
Linode (Akamai Cloud) may run on Akamai (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Linode (Akamai Cloud). Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Linode (Akamai Cloud) or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers Linode (Akamai Cloud) may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Linode (Akamai Cloud). No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Customer Security Advisory: PHP Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities
none postmortem · started · resolved
5 updates
- investigating
Akamai is aware of the recently published (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) vulnerabilities and our teams are actively investigating its potential impact across our platform and infrastructure. As a part of ongoing mitigation efforts, some Quick Deploy Apps, speed test pages, and parts of the website may be unavailable. If you are running a vulnerable version of PHP on a Linode instance, we recommend following guidance from the upstream vendor (PHP) and applying upstream patches as they become available. We will provide updates as additional information becomes available.
- identified
Updated Guidance after assessment: Akamai is aware of the recently published (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) vulnerabilities and our teams are actively investigating its potential impact across our platform and infrastructure. As a part of ongoing mitigation efforts, our Cloud Infrastructure Speed Tests will be unavailable. If you are running a vulnerable version of PHP on a Linode instance, we recommend following guidance from the upstream vendor (PHP) and applying upstream patches as they become available. We will provide updates as additional information becomes available.
- identified
Akamai is aware of the recently published (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) vulnerabilities and our teams are actively investigating its potential impact across our platform and infrastructure. As a part of ongoing mitigation efforts, our Cloud Infrastructure Speed Tests will be unavailable. If you are running a vulnerable version of PHP on a Linode instance, we recommend following guidance from the upstream vendor (PHP) and applying upstream patches as they become available. We will provide updates as additional information becomes available.
- resolved
Akamai has completed its assessment of the recently published PHP remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) across our platform and infrastructure, and mitigation efforts are complete. Cloud Infrastructure Speed Tests will remain offline in the near term. We plan to bring them back online in the near future. If you are running a vulnerable version of PHP on a Linode instance, we recommend following guidance from the upstream vendor (PHP) and applying upstream patches as they become available. We appreciate your patience while our teams completed this work.
- postmortem
On October 10, 2026, Akamai became aware of two zero-day remote code execution \(RCE\) vulnerabilities affecting the PHP core engine, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Akamai began a platform-wide investigation, and deployed global Web Application Firewall \(WAF\) mitigation rules on October 21, 2026, and carried out remediation protocols across potentially impacted infrastructure. At this time, Akamai has observed no evidence that these vulnerabilities impacted core Akamai products, API calls, or the Akamai Control Center \(ACC\). The potential scope included PHP Core, Linode Speed Test Services, and Quick Deploy Marketplace applications. As a precaution, Akamai temporarily disabled Cloud Infrastructure Speed Tests while teams isolated and rebuilt related systems. Akamai deployed protective WAF rules across the Akamai edge platform to inspect and mitigate potential exploit
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.