Operational Harness status
harness.io · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread Harness problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Infrastructure as Code Management (IaCM)
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 46 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Single Customer: IaCM pipeline executions failing intermittently in Prod 1”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Harness' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Harness. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Harness, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers Harness may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Harness. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Single Customer: IaCM pipeline executions failing intermittently in Prod 1
minor postmortem · started · resolved
5 updates
- investigating
We are currently investigating this issue.
- investigating
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
- identified
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
- resolved
This incident has been resolved.
- postmortem
## Summary On **Tuesday, 6 October 2026**, IaCM pipelines that use the **OpenTofu plugin** in **Prod1** failed intermittently for a production accountAffected runs injected secrets successfully, then later steps timed out or failed authentication. The same pipeline often succeeded on retry, with no configuration change. Typical failing executions ran for about 90 minutes. Other Harness modules were not broadly impacted. We have no report of customer data loss. Pipelines that finished inside the token lifetime were unaffected by this defect. ## Root Cause The IaCM stages minted authentication tokens that expired after one hour. Policy checks later in a long run then rejected the token, so the step timed out or failed authentication. That one-hour lifetime was fixed. Runs of about 90 minutes crossed the one-hour mark, which is why the failures showed up on longer pipelines and often cleare
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.