Operational bunny.net status
bunny.net · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread bunny.net problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: normal.
- Vendor status page Operational · 2 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP AS200325 prefixes seen by 100% of RIPE RIS peers
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: API
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 12 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: monitoring a fix on “Security update regarding one of our infrastructure providers”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- AS200325 prefixes seen by 100% of RIPE RIS peers. evidence confidence: medium
What we don't know: what is happening inside bunny.net's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “monitoring a fix”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: normal. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on bunny.net. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on bunny.net, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers bunny.net may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with bunny.net. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Security update regarding one of our infrastructure providers
none monitoring · started
2 updates
- monitoring
We're reaching out to inform you of a security incident involving one of our infrastructure providers, the steps we've taken, and what this means for you. Incident Summary: On November 17, an infrastructure provider reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One bunny.net CDN node in Pakistan was hosted on an affected server. The node in question had already been out of traffic rotation for over a week due to ongoing network maintenance and was not serving requests. Our engineering team took immediate action. The affected node had already been out of traffic rotation for over a week and was not actively serving requests due to ongoing maintenance related to regional network stability issues. Within 8 minutes of receiving the alert, we removed the server from our system entirely. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigati
- monitoring
We have completed the reissue of all managed TLS certificates for custom domains, along with the certificates for bunny.net platform domains (b-cdn.net and bunny.run). All affected certificates are now being served with new private keys, and no action is required from customers using managed certificates. We are now working towards revoking the certificates associated with the previous private keys and will post a further update once this is complete. If you manage your own TLS certificates, we continue to recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution. Our support team is happy to help if you need any assistance.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.